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Abstract
We study the development of a social norm of trust and reciprocity among a group of
strangers via the contagious strategy as deﬁned in Kandori (1992). Over an inﬁnite horizon,
the players anonymously and randomly meet each other and play a binary trust game. In
order to provide the investors with proper incentives to follow the contagious strategy, there
is a suﬃcient condition that requires that there exist an outside option for the investors.
Moreover, the investors' payoﬀ from the outside option must converge to the payoﬀ from
trust and reciprocity as the group size goes to inﬁnity. We show that this suﬃcient condition
is also a necessary condition to sustain any sequential equilibrium in which the trustees adopt
the contagious strategy. Our results imply that a contagious equilibrium only supports trust
if trust contributes almost nothing to the investors' payoﬀs.
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1 Introduction
One of the most important issues in economics is how to sustain cooperation when players have a
short-term incentive to deviate from cooperative behavior. Economists have long recognized that
reputation is an eﬀective means of enforcing cooperation when there exists an institution to track
and disseminate information on players' past behavior, or when the group is small so people are
intimately familiar with one another's history. These personal enforcement mechanisms make
quick and substantial retaliations possible. The Folk Theorem in the repeated game literature
(Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) provides a formal model of personal enforcement, showing that
any mutually beneﬁcial outcome can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium if the same
set of players play the same stage game ad inﬁnitum (Kandori, 1992).
When economic interactions happen among essentially anonymous players, as noted by Kan-
dori (1992), community enforcement is required to provide incentives for agents not to deviate
from cooperative behavior. In this case, dishonest behavior against one partner causes sanctions
by other agents in the community. Kandori (1992) examines an inﬁnite-horizon model where
agents are anonymously and randomly paired to each other and play a Prisoner's Dilemma game.
Even when each agent knows nothing more than his personal experience, Kandori shows that a
community can still sustain cooperation via a contagious strategy, in which players who de-
fected or experienced defection in the past choose non-cooperation forever. In the equilibrium,
a deviator could be indirectly punished if the deviation were to trigger a contagious reaction
that destroyed the social norm of cooperation. If the consequences of the eventual destruction
of the cooperative norm were suﬃciently severe and credible, then the threat of the contagious
reactions might sustain a social norm of cooperation. Ellison (1994) extends Kandori's work by
introducing a public randomization device and remedies two issues with Kandori's results. First,
the equilibrium in Ellison (1994) does not require excessive patience of players and applies to
more general payoﬀ structures. Secondly, the equilibrium is stable and eﬃcient with noise, and
a single deviation or mistake will not lead to a complete destruction of cooperation due to the
property of contagious reaction.1 2
1See Ghosh and Ray (1996), Greif (1993), Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995) and Tirole (1996) for several
related models.
2There are also several experimental studies that directly test the contagious equilibrium. Duﬀy and Ochs
(2008) test Kandori's (1992) contagious equilibrium with an indeﬁnitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under
diﬀerent matching protocols and diﬀerent amounts of information transmission. Their results suggest that random
matching works to prevent the development of a cooperative norm in the laboratory, even when some information
is provided about the prior choices of opponents. Camera and Casari (2008) test the contagious equilibrium
with indeﬁnitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under random matching, but focus on the role of private or public
monitoring of the players' choices. They ﬁnd that such monitoring can lead to a signiﬁcant increase in the
frequency of cooperation relative to the case of no monitoring. Duﬀy, Xie and Lee (2011) experimentally test
the contagious equilibrium using a trust game and ﬁnd that trust and reciprocity must rely on the availability of
individual reputational information. Societal reputation as suggested by the contagious equilibrium is not enough
to sustain a high level of trust and reciprocity even with a group size of six individuals.
1
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the concept of contagious equilibrium
(Kandori, 1992) can be extended to classes of games other than the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
In particular, we focus on a binary trust game modiﬁed from Berg et al. (1995). In our version of
the trust game, the investor (ﬁrst mover) ﬁrst decides whether to invest her endowment with the
trustee (second mover) or choose the outside option.3 If the investor invests, the endowment is
multiplied by a ﬁxed factor greater than one and it falls on the trustee to decide whether to keep
the whole amount or return some fraction of it to the investor. When the game is played one-
shot, the unique equilibrium outcome is for the trustee not to reciprocate and the investor not to
trust. Unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma game, there is no dominant strategy for the investor in the
trust game. The trust game represents a one-sided rather than a two-sided incentive problem.
That is, knowing the partner will cooperate, only the trustee has an incentive to deviate from the
cooperative outcome. Therefore, the game captures the feature of some real-life examples such
as transactions between buyers and sellers on the Internet or loan repayment in credit markets,
which usually have a sequential-move game structure and only the second mover has an incentive
problem. Following Kandori (1992), in our model a ﬁnite population of anonymous agents are
randomly paired with each other in each period and play the binary trust game. Players can
neither recognize nor communicate the identity of any of their past opponents, and they do not
observe the outcomes of games in which they are not involved or any aggregate information
about the entire community.
We ﬁnd a suﬃcient condition that provides the investors with proper incentives to follow the
contagious strategy. However, this suﬃcient condition requires that there should exist an outside
option for the investors. Moreover, only if the outside option almost equals the maximum possible
payoﬀ from trust itself, will the investors choose not to trust a randomly paired trustee after
having experienced non-reciprocative trustees in the past. This suﬃcient condition controls the
investors' incentives to follow the contagious strategy oﬀ the equilibrium path and so supports a
credible threat to keep the trustees from behaving dishonestly. However, the condition becomes
more constraining when the community size becomes larger. In particular, the payoﬀ from the
outside option must approach the payoﬀ from trust and reciprocity when the community size
grows to inﬁnity. This makes the suﬃcient condition essentially useless since the sustaining of
the social norm of trust and reciprocity between anonymous agents is more important in a large
economy than in a small community and in that case trust is only possible if its net beneﬁt to
investors is almost zero.
Importantly, we further examine a more general version of contagious equilibrium. We assume
that the trustees continue to adopt the contagious strategy while the investors are allowed to
choose any strategy based on their consistent beliefs. Then we ask how necessary the suﬃcient
condition on the outside option is to support such a strategy proﬁle in a sequential equilibrium.
In particular, if the investors' outside option is smaller, will it still be possible to support the
3We denote investor as she and trustee as he for clarity.
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social norm of trust and reciprocity in a sequential equilibrium? We show that the investors'
consistent belief system always assigns probability one to the event that there is at most one
non-reciprocating trustee, no matter how many defections the investors observe in their private
history. Therefore, with a smaller outside option, the investors always choose to trust, and
consequently, there is no deterrence to defection of trustees, and the proposed equilibria collapse.
So in order to sustain the social norm of trust and reciprocity in any sequential equilibrium
involving the contagious strategy, it is necessary to have an outside option for the investors that
converges to the payoﬀ from trust and reciprocity in a large community. This necessity of the
condition implies that the contagious equilibrium only supports trust if trust contributes almost
nothing to the investors' payoﬀs.
This paper is the ﬁrst, to the best of our knowledge, that tries to extend the contagious
equilibrium to games other than the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Sociologically, the trust game
represents social exchange or risk taking while the Prisoner's Dilemma illustrates social conﬂict.
As noted by Ellison (1994), the results of the previous papers rely on the game structure of
the Prisoner's Dilemma: it has dominant strategies for both players and simultaneous moves.
The negative result presented in this paper seems to be more associated with the fact that the
investor in the trust game does not have a dominant strategy rather than the fact that the trust
game has sequential moves, as discussed later in the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the inﬁnitely repeated
random matching model with a binary trust game. Section 3 deﬁnes the contagious strategy and
describes the suﬃcient condition for the investors. Section 4 proves the necessity of the suﬃcient
condition. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We ﬁrst describe the structure of the repeated random matching game. The set of players
N = {1, 2, . . . , 2n} is partitioned into two sets of equal size, the set of investors NI = {1, 2, . . . , n}
and the set of trustees NT = {n + 1, n + 2, . . . , 2n}. In each period, each investor is randomly
paired with one trustee and they play the following binary trust game modiﬁed from Berg et al.
(1995).
At the beginning of the game, the investor is endowed with an amount a ∈ (0, 1). If the
investor decides not to invest (NI), the game ends. The investor's payoﬀ is a (the value of her
outside option) and the trustee's payoﬀ is 0. If the investor chooses to invest (I) her endowment,
this choice yields an immediate gross return of 1, but the division of this gross return is up to
the trustee, who moves second and decides whether to keep (K) all of the gross return for a
payoﬀ of 1 for himself and 0 for the investor or to return (R) a fraction 0 < b < 1 to the investor,
earning a payoﬀ of 1− b for himself. Throughout we shall assume that 0 < a < b < 1, so that it













Figure 1: The Trust Game
outside option, and the trustee has an incentive to keep all the return once the investor invests.
The trust game we study is depicted in Figure 1.
This binary trust game well represents the situation in a one-sided incentive problem (Kan-
dori, 1992). Unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma game, there is no dominant strategy for the investor
in the trust game since she prefers cooperation to her outside option. The trustee as a second
mover, however, has an incentive to deviate from cooperation. The game can also apply to a
trading situation in which the buyer needs to make a payment ﬁrst and the seller chooses whether
or not to ship the good after receiving the payment. If the binary trust game is only played once,
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is for the investor not to invest and for the trustee to
keep all the return.
In this model we assume that pairings between investors and trustees are independent and
uniform in each period. Let mt(i) denote investor i's match at time t. By uniform random
matching, Pr[mt(i) = j] =
1
n for all investors i ∈ NI and trustees j ∈ NT and for all t. Each
period every pair of investor and trustee play the binary trust game described above as a stage
game. This procedure is repeated inﬁnitely and each player's total payoﬀ is the expected sum of
his stage payoﬀs discounted by δ ∈ (0, 1).
In the entire paper, we assume that each player only observes the history of action proﬁles
in the stage games that he has experienced. When paired with another player, a player has no
idea about the identity of his match or the previous experience of his match or that of any other
player. Therefore, a player cannot base his action on his personal experience with the current
match. Neither can his choice be based on any information on the plays between his match and
other players in the community or on any aggregate information about the entire community.
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3 A Suﬃcient Condition for Contagious Equilibrium
In this section, we ﬁrst deﬁne the concept of contagious equilibrium in the inﬁnitely repeated
trust game with random matching, following the seminal work of Kandori (1992). Deﬁne NI
(No Invest) as the defection of an investor, and K (Keep) as the defection of a trustee. Deﬁne
d-type investors or trustees as those whose private history includes defection by themselves or
their partners. Otherwise, the players are deﬁned as c-type.
Deﬁnition 1 The contagious strategy is deﬁned as follows: An investor chooses I (Invest) if
she is c-type and NI (No Invest) if she is d-type. A trustee chooses R (Return) if he is c-type
and K (Keep) if he is d-type.
Under the contagious strategy, a player who experienced either dishonest or untrusting be-
havior starts defecting against all of his or her opponents. Since the players are anonymous to
each other, trust is applied to the community as a whole rather than to each individual player,
and a single defection by a player causes the end of trust in the whole community. In order to
show that the contagious strategy constitutes a sequential equilibrium, we need to show that
neither the investors nor the trustees have an incentive to deviate from the contagious strategy,
when the players hold consistent beliefs as deﬁned in Kreps and Wilson (1982).4
In particular, consider the suﬃcient condition for the investors to follow the contagious strat-
egy in a sequential equilibrium. Since the binary trust game represents a one-sided incentive
problem in which the investors prefer the cooperative outcome (I,R) to the outside option, it
is easy to verify that the investors have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium path. In
order for the investors to follow the contagious strategy oﬀ the equilibrium path, we also need to
show that a d-type investor will never choose to trust a trustee again, given any consistent belief
on the number of d-type trustees in the community. It turns out that the following condition







Here (1 − 1n)b is the d-type investor's expected payoﬀ for the current period from choosing to
invest when she believes there is only one d-type trustee.5 This is the strongest condition since it
4In a previous working paper version, we prove the following existence result. For any δ and n ≥ 2, there exist
a and b such that (i) 0 < a < b < 1; and (ii) the contagious strategy constitutes a sequential equilibrium in which
(I, R) is the outcome in every period along the equilibrium path under uniformly random matching. We also
characterize a set of suﬃcient conditions under which the investors and the trustees have no incentives to deviate
from the contagious strategy given any possible consistent belief. Since those conditions require a to approach b
as n approaches inﬁnity, the focus of this paper is to show that one of these very restrictive suﬃcient conditions
to sustain the contagious equilibrium is also a very restrictive necessary condition. Thus, the existence result and
the proof for the suﬃcient condition are not provided here but are available upon request. Interested readers can
also ﬁnd the previous version of the paper on the authors' websites.
5Notice that the investor's payoﬀ in any future period can be assumed to always be the outside option, a, no
matter whether she chooses to invest or not for the current period, since we only need to check that the players
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is suﬃcient even if the investor believes there is more than one d-type trustee in the community.
Condition (1) shows that the existence of the contagious equilibrium critically depends on
a high enough outside option. Since the concept of the contagious equilibrium is based on
community enforcement, dishonest behavior against one partner must cause sanctions by other
members in the society. The development of a cooperative social norm requires a harsh pun-
ishment scheme: investors must stop trusting everyone after one defection, i.e., they must be
suﬃciently pessimistic so that they do not want to trust given their beliefs. The role of the high
outside option a is to provide the investors with enough incentives to carry out the punishment
and to serve as a credible threat for the trustees not to initiate defection.
This condition, however, becomes more restrictive when the population size n becomes larger.
It requires that the outside option, a, converge to the investors' payoﬀ from the outcome of trust
and reciprocity, b. In that case, the gain from the outcome of trust and reciprocity is almost the
same as the gain from taking the outside option for the investors. Then even if the contagious
equilibrium can achieve the social norm of trust and reciprocity in a large anonymous community,
the beneﬁt to the investors is negligible. That is, a contagious equilibrium supports trust if trust
contributes almost nothing to the investors' payoﬀ.
4 Necessity of the Suﬃcient Condition
The question we pose in this section is how necessary the condition a ≥ (1 − 1n)b is to sustain
any (potentially more complicated) sequential equilibrium that is built on the basic idea of a
contagious equilibrium. Notice ﬁrst that this condition is indeed a necessary condition in order
for the contagious strategy in Deﬁnition 1 above to constitute a sequential equilibrium. The
contagious strategy requires any investor, who has ever experienced defection in the past, not
to invest again in all future periods. By the remark in Kandori (1992, page 69), if a player
sees a defection in the ﬁrst period, he must believe that everybody else is cooperating, because
the deﬁnition of consistent belief requires that defections by diﬀerent players are statistically
independent. By the same token, when a player defects when he has seen no defection, he must
believe that he is the ﬁrst person to defect in the society. Similarly, in the trust game, when
an investor experiences defection in the ﬁrst period, she should believe there is only one d-type
trustee in the community. In order for her not to invest in any future period, the one-shot
deviation principle requires a ≥ (1− 1n)b.
When a < (1 − 1n)b, even though an ordinary contagious strategy proﬁle, as deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 1, cannot constitute a sequential equilibrium, it is still interesting to ask whether
there are other more complicated equilibria, built on the basic idea of a contagious equilibrium,
which are sequential.6 Speciﬁcally, consider any equilibrium where, along the equilibrium path,
will not deviate from the contagious strategy in the current period, by the one-shot deviation principle.
6When a < (1 − 1
n
)b, there may be equilibria involving mixing along the equilibrium path, which includes
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the investors trust and the trustees return. Suppose that the outside option, a, is right below
(1 − 1n)b, so the suﬃcient condition is not satisﬁed. In addition, suppose that the trustees
continue to adopt the contagious strategy as deﬁned before. Investors will be willing to invest
if they believe there is only one d-type trustee, but will choose not to invest if they believe
there is more than one d-type trustee. Since the trustees follow a contagious strategy, if an
investor believes there is more than one d-type trustee and starts to defect, defection will spread
to other c-type trustees, and eventually, to other investors who previously believed there was no
more than one d-type trustee. Consequently, as in the ordinary contagious strategy, the fear of
spreading the defection to the entire community may serve as a credible threat for the trustees
not to initiate defection in the ﬁrst place. The question we ask speciﬁcally in this section is
whether this kind of strategy proﬁle can constitute a sequential equilibrium when a < (1− 1n)b.
We will show that it cannot be a sequential equilibrium, since an investor's consistent beliefs
must attach a probability of one to at most one trustee defecting in any given period, no matter
how many defections the investor experienced before. Therefore, the investors always choose to
trust and there is no deterrent to defection by trustees. Thus, the condition a ≥ (1 − 1n)b is
indeed a necessary condition to sustain any sequential equilibrium built on the idea of contagious
equilibrium.
Theorem 1 When a < (1 − 1n)b, any strategy proﬁle in which trustees follow the contagious
strategy cannot be supported as a sequential equilibrium.
Theorem 1 can be proven using the sequence of lemmas below. Consider any equilibrium
where, along the equilibrium path, the investors invest with their paired trustee and the trustees
choose to return. If an investor ever sees a defection by one or more trustees, then she may cease
to trust her future trustees. Let T be the ﬁrst period where some investors cease to trust, given
that they have seen one or more defections in the past. The key thing to show is that consistent
beliefs on the part of the investor must put probability one on at most one trustee defecting in
period T . It will then turn out that investors will continue to trust their trustees in period T
(contrary to the above assumption) when a < (1− 1n)b .
Let Dt be the number of diﬀerent trustees who have ever defected, on or before period t. As
in Kreps and Wilson (1982), we model consistent beliefs by considering trembles. We begin by
showing that, in any period t ≤ T , if there is only one tremble up to and including period t, the
number of diﬀerent trustees, Dt, who defect at least once, up to and including period t, cannot
exceed one. In other words, if there is more than one defecting trustee in any period t ≤ T , it
must be the case that there have occurred more than one tremble up to and including period t.
Notice that Lemma 1 will be implicitly used in the proof of Lemmas 2-5 below.
some trust. However, in such equilibrium, the payoﬀ from Invest must equal to the payoﬀ from the outside option
for the investors. So trust has almost no value to the investors, just as it has almost no value to the investors in




Lemma 1 For any period t ≤ T , if there is only one tremble up to and including period t, then
Dt = 1.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst a tremble by a trustee. That trustee may or may not defect again in
future periods. However, by assumption, for all periods strictly before period T , investors will
not cease to trust their trustees, no matter how many defecting trustees they meet. Thus, a
trustee's defection cannot spread, through an investor, to another trustee. Of course, a trustee's
defection before period T may induce investors to defect in period T , and so, spread to other
trustees in period T + 1. But an initial tremble by one trustee will not spread to other trustees
until strictly after period T .
Next consider an initial tremble by an investor. That investor's initial defection may lead a
trustee to begin defecting. However, in all future periods strictly before period T , the investor
herself, who trembled in the previous period, will go back to trusting unless she is hit by additional
trembles, by the deﬁnition of T . In addition, by the same logic as in the last paragraph, in all
future periods strictly before period T , the defected-against trustee will not spread defection,
through other investors, to another trustee. Thus, again, the result of a single tremble is that at
most one trustee will begin defecting.
Now, consider any history hT=1 faced by an investor as of the beginning of period T (so
hT=1 does not include what happens in period T itself). If hT=1 involves no defections, then the
investor believes, with probability at least 1=, that DT = 0, where  is the probability of at
least one tremble in the ﬁrst T periods.
Next we show that, if hT−1 involves at least one defection, the investor believes, with prob-
ability one, that there is only one trustee defecting in period T . The proof works by focusing
on the ﬁrst period in hT−1 in which a given investor observes a defection by a trustee. Thus, ﬁx
an investor and a history hT−1 for that investor, and suppose that τ is the period of the ﬁrst
defection by a trustee in hT−1.
Lemma 2 Let D be the total number of defections by trustees in hT−1. Let 1 be the probability
of at least two trembles as of period T , given exactly one tremble as of period τ . Then









P (hT−1|Dτ = 1) =P (hT−1|hτ−1, Dτ = 1)P (hτ−1|Dτ = 1)
≥P (hT−1|hτ−1, Dτ = 1)P (hτ−1|D1 = Dτ = 1),
(3)
where the ﬁrst equality is a basic property of conditional probabilities, and the inequality holds
because hτ−1 is a sequence of purely cooperative returns, and so, given Dτ = 1, is least likely
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if it is also the case that D1 = 1 (i.e., the untrustworthy tremble occurred in the ﬁrst period).
Now,






since this is the probability of τ − 1 trustworthy returns in a row, given that there is one
untrustworthy trustee out of a total of n trustees. Note, here, as well as in (7) and (13) below,
that it is important that trustees are assumed to follow a contagious strategy. That is, if they
ever defect (e.g., if they are hit by a tremble), then they continue to defect forever. Next,
P (hT−1|hτ−1, Dτ = 1) = P (hT−1|hτ−1, DT = Dτ = 1)P (DT = 1|hτ−1, Dτ = 1)
+ P (hT−1|hτ−1, DT > Dτ = 1)P (DT > 1|hτ−1, Dτ = 1).
(5)
Now, by Lemma 1,
P (DT > 1|hτ−1, Dτ = 1) = 1 and P (DT = 1|hτ−1, Dτ = 1) = 1− 1. (6)
Also,








Using (6) and (7) in (5) gives








Combining (4) and (8) in (3) yields (2).
The above lemma shows that the probability of hT−1, given Dτ = 1, does not vanish as the
probability of trembles vanishes. The next lemma shows that, if the investor ﬁrst observes an
untrustworthy trustee in period τ , she assumes that there is almost certainly only one untrust-
worthy trustee as of period τ .
Lemma 3 Let 2 be the probability of at least two trembles as of period τ , given at least one
tremble as of period τ . Then P (Dτ = 1|hT−1) = 1 +O(2).
Proof.
P (Dτ = 1|hT−1) = P (hT−1|Dτ = 1)P (Dτ = 1)
P (hT−1|Dτ = 1)P (Dτ = 1) + P (hT−1|Dτ > 1)P (Dτ > 1) . (9)
Let 0 be the probability of at least one tremble as of period τ . Let 2 be the probability of at
least two trembles as of period τ , given at least one tremble as of period τ , as in the statement
of the lemma. Then P (Dτ = 1) = (1− 2)0 and P (Dτ > 1) = 20. Using these with (2) from
Lemma 2 gives
P (Dτ = 1|hT−1) = A(1− 2)0
A(1− 2)0 + P (hT−1|Dτ > 1)20 = 1 +O(2), (10)
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since A does not approach zero as 0, 1 and 2 do, by Lemma 2.
The next two lemmas show that, if the investor believes Dτ = 1 in period τ , then, no matter
what happens between periods τ and T , he will be nearly certain that DT = 1 as of period T .
Lemma 4 With notation as in Lemma 2,








Proof. Using logic very similar to that in (3),
P (hT−1|DT = Dτ = 1) ≥P (hT−1|hτ−1, DT = Dτ = 1)P (hτ−1|D1 = Dτ = 1). (12)
Simple probability calculations then show that










which immediately yields (11).
Finally, we show that the investor puts most of her weight on DT = 1, given Dτ = 1, if she
has ever seen a defection.
Lemma 5 As in Lemma 2, let 1 be the probability of at least one additional tremble after period
τ , given Dτ = 1. Then P (DT = 1|hT−1, Dτ = 1) = 1 +O(1).
Proof.
P (DT = 1|hT−1, Dτ = 1)
=
P (hT−1|DT = Dτ = 1)P (DT = 1|Dτ = 1)
P (hT−1|DT = Dτ = 1)P (DT = 1|Dτ = 1) + P (hT−1|DT > Dτ = 1)P (DT > 1|Dτ = 1) .
(14)
Using (11), this becomes
P (DT = 1|hT−1, Dτ = 1) = B(1− 1)
B(1− 1) +O(1) = 1 +O(1), (15)
which proves the result.
Proof of the Theorem. Since hT−1 involves a defection in period τ , DT = 1, combined with
hT−1, implies Dτ = 1. Thus,
P (DT = 1|hT−1) = P (DT = Dτ = 1|hT−1)
= P (DT = 1|hT−1, Dτ = 1)P (Dτ = 1|hT−1) = (1 +O(1))(1 +O(2)), (16)
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by Lemma 5 and Lemma 3, respectively. The result now follows from the argument in the ﬁrst
paragraph after the statement of the theorem.
We have shown that the suﬃcient condition a ≥ (1 − 1n)b is also a necessary condition to
support any sequential equilibrium in which the trustees adopt the contagious strategy. This
result implies that it may be diﬃcult to extend the concept of contagious equilibrium from the
Prisoner's Dilemma game as in Kandori (1992) to other classes of games, as conﬁrmed by the
experimental evidence in Duﬀy, Xie, and Lee (2012).
One question we want to ask is which aspect of the game structure in the trust game yields
this negative result compared to Kandori (1992). The trust game we examine in this paper is
diﬀerent from the Prisoner's Dilemma game in two respects: ﬁrst, the players move sequentially
rather than simultaneously; second, only the trustee (second mover) has a dominant strategy.
In order to further investigate this question, consider the case where the stage game is replaced
by the following normal-form version of the original sequential trust game.
Keep Return
Invest 0, 1 b, 1− b
No Invest a, 0 a, 0
Given that the investor is the ﬁrst mover of the sequential trust game, the information
available to the investor before she makes an investment decision in each period is the history
of previous outcomes in both sequential trust game and the normal form version of the trust
game. The investor would learn more in the normal form from periods where she did not trust,
but that does not aﬀect the proof. Therefore, it is easy to verify that Theorem 1 still holds if we
change the stage game from the sequential trust game to the normal-form trust game. That is,
the condition a ≥ (1 − 1n)b is also a necessary condition to support any sequential equilibrium
in which the trustees adopt the contagious strategy in a random matching model where the
stage game is the normal-form trust game. This observation implies that the negative result of
Theorem 1 comes from the fact that the investor (ﬁrst mover) of the sequential trust game does
not have a dominant strategy rather than from the fact that the trust game has a sequential
structure of moves.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides the ﬁrst analysis of the development of trust and reciprocity among strangers
based on the concept of contagious equilibrium. The trust game represents a one-sided incen-
tive problem rather than a two-sided incentive problem such as the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
Kandori (1992) discusses cooperation in the one-sided incentive problem under local information
processing, in which each player carries a label and the label is revised based on the actions taken
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by the matched players in each period. In contrast, we consider the one-sided incentive problem
under the most restrictive information structure, that is, players neither observe the outcomes
of games in which they are not involved, nor recognize the identity of their opponents.
We ﬁnd that, in order to sustain the contagious strategy as a sequential equilibrium, it is
necessary for the investors to have a high outside option. In fact, the investor's payoﬀ from the
outside option must converge to that from trust and reciprocity as the community size increases
to inﬁnity. Therefore, a contagious equilibrium only supports trust when trust contributes almost
nothing to the investors' payoﬀs. This negative result suggests that when the game structure
changes, speciﬁcally, when one player does not have a dominant strategy, it is unlikely that the
concept of contagious equilibrium will extend from the Prisoner's Dilemma game to other classes
of games such as the trust game.
The necessary condition is based on the assumption that the trustees adopt the contagious
strategy. For future research, it would be interesting to investigate whether strategies with more
forgiveness can sustain trust and reciprocity in equilibrium. On the other hand, we may consider
situations with less information restrictions and where diﬀerent mechanisms coexist and interact
with each other. For instance, what happens if some investors can observe the trustees' previous
behavior, and use a strategy conditional on reputational information, while other investors cannot
observe the information and follow the contagious strategy?
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